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 Competiveness of Latin American Exports in the U.S. Banana Market 
Abstract 
U.S. banana demand differentiated by country of origin is estimated using the generalized 
dynamic Rotterdam model.  Results indicate that dynamic factors play a significant role in 
determining the allocation of U.S. banana expenditures across exporting sources.  Of particular 
interest is Guatemala’s increased share and Costa Rica’s decreased share of the U.S. banana 
market.  A number of factors explained why Guatemala replaced Costa Rica as the leading U.S. 
supplier in 2007.  (1) Guatemala is the least expensive source on average.  (2) Habit persistence, 
adjustment costs, and other dynamic factors favor Guatemala’s exports.  (3) Given increases in 
the relative price of Costa Rica’s bananas, the price competition between Costa Rica and 
Guatemala is highly significant.  (4) Bananas from Costa Rica are highly responsive to own-
price while imports from Guatemala are more price-inelastic.  (5) Heavy rains and fluctuating 
temperatures in Costa Rica have decreased banana production and exports. 
JEL Classifications: F14, Q11, Q13, Q17  
Key words: bananas, imports, demand, Latin America, United States  
 
1.   Introduction 
The United States ranks first among banana importing countries.  In 2009, U.S. banana imports 
equaled $1.9 billion, accounting for 20% of global banana trade.  Bananas are also the leading 
fruit imported by the United States, and due to negligible domestic production, imports account 
for nearly all of U.S. consumption (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2010; UN Comtrade, 2010). 
About 95% of U.S. fresh banana imports come from five countries: Guatemala, Ecuador, 
Costa Rica, Colombia, and Honduras (table 1).  In 2000, Costa Rica was the leading U.S. 
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 supplier accounting for 31.4% of the U.S. banana market, while Guatemala was the third leading 
supplier accounting for 17.6%.  However, during the period 2000−09 there was a significant 
reversal in market share for these two countries.  Although the value of U.S. banana imports has 
increased since 2000, particularly from 2006 to 2009 where imports grew by 32%, imports from 
Costa Rica have steadily declined and its share of the U.S. market has fallen to 14.5%.  During 
this same period, Guatemala’s share of the U.S. market increased to 29.6%, making it the leading 
U.S. supplier. 
[Place Table 1 approximately here] 
The emergence of Guatemala and Costa Rica’s decline is to some extent due to the recent 
changes in total banana exports for each country.  From 2000 to 2005, Guatemala’s total exports 
increased by 41%, while Costa Rica’s total exports decreased by 15%.  Unlike Guatemala, Costa 
Rica relies less on the United States for export disappearance.  The United States accounts for 
about 80% to 90% of Guatemala’s fresh banana exports.  In contrast, EU countries and Russia 
account for about half of all banana exports from Costa Rica (FAOSTAT, 2010). 
This study examines the factors that determine U.S. fresh banana imports and assesses 
the competitiveness of the countries that supply fresh bananas to the United States. Of particular 
interest is how factors such as import prices, U.S. banana expenditures, habit persistence, and 
import trends explain changes in the allocation of U.S. banana expenditures across supplying 
countries.  This is important because the banana sector is a major source of foreign exchange for 
the Central and South American countries that supply fresh bananas to the United States.  
Furthermore, there is a strong connection between banana-generated income and household food 
security where changes in export volume can affect workers in the primary sector, as well as 
supporting sectors.  For instance, Haines, Cashin and Mlachila (2010) found that banana trade 
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 between the European Union (EU) and Caribbean countries had considerable macroeconomic 
impacts, especially on economic growth in Caribbean countries.  In 2006, bananas accounted for 
9.3% of export earnings in Ecuador, 7.7% in Costa Rica, 6.8% in Honduras and 5.9% in 
Guatemala (UNCTAD, 2010).  The economic consequences of decreased U.S. demand could be 
quite substantial for those banana-producing countries that depend on the U.S. market for export 
disappearance. 
The generalized dynamic Rotterdam model (Bushehri, 2003) is used to estimate U.S. 
banana demand differentiated by exporting source while accounting for noninstantaneous 
adjustments in import demand.  The import demand estimates are then used to derive short-run 
and long-run expenditure and price elasticities.  Estimation results are used to explain how 
Guatemala replaced Costa Rica as the leading U.S. supplier in 2007.   
Although bananas are fairly homogeneous across exporting countries it is not uncommon 
for a country to import a homogeneous product from multiple sources and for import preferences 
to be differentiated by source (Wolak and Kolstad, 1991).  Source-differentiation can results 
from a number of factors such as a country’s reputation for a quality product, trade history, 
reliability and consistency, and political issues tied to trade (Lopez, Pagoulatos, and Gonzalez, 
2006; Zhou and Novakovic, 1996).  Importers may view homogeneous products as source-
differentiated given risk perceptions about exporting counties where the allocation of total 
imports across countries is a way to minimize import risk (Wolak and Kolstad, 1991).    
Several studies have examined fruit demand and trade in a source-differentiated context.  
Seale, Sparks, and Buxton (1992) and Richards, Ispelen, and Kagan (1997) analyzed the demand 
for fresh apples differentiated by source and assessed the competitiveness of U.S. apple exports 
in selected international markets.  Andayani and Tilley (1997) used the almost ideal demand 
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 system to estimate source-differentiated demand for apples, oranges, grapes, and other fruit in 
Indonesia, and Sparks (1992) estimated the demand for source-differentiated oranges in the EU, 
Singapore, Japan, Canada, and Hong Kong.  While the scholarly literature on world banana trade 
is quite extensive, econometric studies highlighting the importance of source are absent from the 
literature.  Furthermore, owing to prominent changes in EU banana policy, most studies of the 
banana trade have focused on fresh banana imports by the EU. For examples see Anania (2006); 
Guyomard, Laroche, and Le Mouel (1999); and Deodhar and Sheldon (1995). 
 
2. Background 
Banana production and trade is characterized by high levels of regional concentration.  The top 
10 banana-producing countries accounted for more than 75% of world banana production in 
2007, with India, China, the Philippines, Brazil, and Ecuador being among the world’s major 
producers.  In the last quarter century, Latin America’s dominance has given way to increased 
production in Asian countries.  In the 1970s, Latin America accounted for more than half of 
world production versus about one-third for Asian countries.  However, Asia’s production 
increased during the 1990s and 2000s reaching about 60% of world production in 2007.  Latin 
America now accounts for about one-third of world production (UNCTAD, 2010). 
Latin American countries still account for a major share of global banana trade.  In 2007 
for instance, Latin America accounted for only 31% of world production but 72% of world 
exports (UNCTAD, 2010; FAOSTAT, 2010).  The major U.S. suppliers, Ecuador, Costa Rica, 
Colombia, Guatemala and Honduras, ranked first, second, fourth, fifth and seventh in the world, 
respectively, accounting for about two-thirds of world banana trade in 2009.  Ecuador alone 
accounted for 28% of world banana trade (UN Comtrade, 2010).  
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 The United States and EU are major export destinations for Latin America’s banana 
exports.  While relative proximity contributes to the importance of the U.S. market for export 
disappearance, some Latin American countries are relatively less dependent on the United States 
than others.  In 2009, Russia and Italy purchased about 40% of Ecuador’s banana exports while 
the United States accounted for 22%.  Germany and Belgium also accounted for a significant 
share of Ecuador’s banana exports at about 10% and 6%, respectively.  For Costa Rica, the 
United States has become relatively less important overtime.  In 2001, the United States 
accounted for 58% of Cost Rica’s banana exports. By 2009, the United States accounted for a 
smaller percent (46%) while the EU accounted for 51%.  Contrastingly, the United States 
accounts for over 85% of Guatemala’s banana exports (UN Comtrade, 2010).  
Three multinational corporations—Chiquita Brands International, Dole Food Company, 
Inc., and Fresh Del Monte Produce Inc. (hereafter referred to as the “Top 3”)—are responsible 
for marketing about 70% of the world’s banana exports (UNCTAD, 2009; personal 
communiqué, 2010).  Each of the Top 3 owns or part owns banana plantations in Central and 
South America and other banana-producing regions in the world.  Within Central and South 
America, Chiquita produces bananas in Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, and 
Honduras (Chiquita Brands International, 2010 ); Dole owns banana plantations in Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, and Honduras (Dole Food Company, 2010: 41); Fresh Del Monte produces bananas in 
Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Brazil (Fresh Del Monte Produce Inc., 2010). In addition, the Top 3 
package fruit under their respective logos purchased from national banana companies, 
cooperatives, and individual growers as long as it meets their quality specifications (personal 
communiqué, 2010; CIRAD, 2007). 
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 After the Top 3, the next two leading banana marketers are Exportadora Bananera Noboa 
S.A., an Ecuadorean firm, and Fyffe’s, an Irish company.  Rather than owning its own 
plantations, Fyffe’s purchases bananas on a yearly contract basis from small farmers, 
cooperatives, and national producers and then markets them in Europe and the United States. 
Currently, Fyffe’s purchases fruit from Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Colombia, and Belize. 
National banana companies such as Colombia’s Uniban-Turbana market almost all of the 
remainder of the world’s banana exports.  
It would be a mistake to view the Top 3 as a homogeneous group.  Each of the Top 3 has 
a unique corporate history that has led to a unique business structure.  Chiquita Brands 
International emerged from a prearranged bankruptcy restructuring in 2002; Dole Food 
Company, Inc. was split off from the firm’s former real estate operations in 1995; and Fresh Del 
Monte Produce was acquired by the IAT Group, an international produce company, in 1996. 
Moreover, the geographic locations of the Big 3’s production, marketing, and sourcing 
operations give each firm a particular set of advantages and disadvantages.  For example, 
flooding has affected Fresh Del Monte Produce’s banana operations in Guatemala in 2010 and in 
Costa Rica in 2007. 
 
3.  Dynamic Import Demand Model 
Due to habit persistence and/or adjustment costs, quantity demanded may not be fully responsive 
to changes in exogenous variables in the short-run but partially adjust over several periods 
(Pollak, 1970; Sexauer, 1977).  To account for the lagged responsiveness in U.S. fresh banana 
imports, the generalized dynamic Rotterdam model (Bushehri, 2003) is used in estimation.  To 
limit the analysis to fresh bananas, a multistage budgeting process is assumed where 
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 expenditures are first allocated to the product group fresh bananas.  Then, banana expenditures 
are allocated across the banana exporting countries.  It is further assumed that fresh bananas and 
other product groups are blockwise dependent, which implies that the utility interaction between 
bananas and other products is independent of the exporting country or product origin.  Theil and 
Clements (1987: 180-182) show that blockwise dependence is sufficient for the existence of a 
conditional differential demand system limited to goods within a product group. 
 Let  q and p denote the quantity and price of bananas, respectively, h denote a measure of 
dynamic behavior or habit persistence, i and j denote the product origin (exporting country), n 
denote the number of source countries, and x denote total expenditures where 
1
n
ii i x pq
= =∑ .  
Following Bushehri (2003), the dynamic Rotterdam model is specified as 
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Note that for any variable y,  d() / d yy t = 
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ii i i wp q
= =
. wi is the share of total expenditures allocated 
to bananas from the ith country ( i p q i ∑ ). φij can be defined as the responsiveness of 
quantity demanded for good i to changes in past imports of good j.  i η  is the expenditure 
elasticity, and 
*
ij η  is the compensated price elasticity.  Without the dynamic adjustment term
, equation (1) is similar to the absolute price version of the Rotterdam model 
found in Theil (1980) where the term in brackets is the change in real aggregate expenditures and 
the last term denotes the impact of price changes on the quantity imported. 
/ ) ii j j jwh ∑  φ ( j h t
The empirical form of equation (1) requires that continuous time changes be replaced 
with discrete time changes.  Theil (1980) and Bushehri (2003) suggest log differences.  Since 
monthly data are used in the analysis and U.S. banana imports are seasonal, we use the 12-period 
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 log difference to correct for seasonal variation (Lee, 1988).  Therefore, the change in quantity 
and price is approximated as follows: 
12 log log / ( ) tt t qqq q q − Δ= − ≈  t t  and  12 log log / ( ) tt t ppp p p − Δ =− ≈  . 
The term in brackets in equation (1) is equal to the Divisia volume index, which is a 
measure of real aggregate expenditures (Theil 1980).  We replace this term with a discrete 
measure of the Divisia volume index  t Q Δ , where  
11 1 /( ) ( /( ) )
nn n
ti i t t j j j j ij j Qw q xw p x x tw p p
== = Δ= Δ= Δ − Δ≈ − ∑∑ ∑  t .     (2) 
Specific to this study,   is a measure of change in real aggregate expenditures on fresh banana 
imports. 
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where   is a distributed lag of the quantities imported in log-difference form.  ijk jt k kj q − Δ ∑∑α
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*
ij it ij w = πη .  i γ ,  ijk γ ,  i θ , and 
ij π  are parameters to be estimated, and  it ε  is a random disturbance term.  Equation (4) states t
the change in the quantity imported from country i weighted by the ith import share is a funct
of past imports from that country (and competing countries) 
hat 
ion 
jtk q − , real expenditures on fresh 
bananas from all countries  t Q Δ , and individual import prices  jt p .  
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   Demand theory requires the following parameter restrictions: 
0 i i = ∑ γ ,   ∀ j and k,  0 ijk i = ∑ γ 1 i i = ∑ θ ,  0 ij i = ∑ π  (adding up); 
0 ij j = ∑ π  (homogeneity);  ij ji = π π  (symmetry); and 
nn i j × ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦ Π π  is negative semidefinite. 
Given the parameters in equation (4), the short-run conditional expenditure and 
compensated (Hicksian) price elasticities are respectively defined as  / i wi θ  and  / ij i w π .  The 
short-run uncompensated (Marshallian) price elasticity is defined as  / ij i i j i ww − / w π θ  (Seale, 
Sparks and Buxton, 1992).  The long-run expenditure, Hicksian and Marshallian price elasticity 
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4.  Data and Statistics  
U.S. import data are provided by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural 
Service, where banana imports are defined according to the Harmonized System classification 
0803002020 fresh bananas.  Plantains and dried bananas are not part of this category.  Monthly 
import data (January 2000−March 2010) measured in kilograms and U.S. dollars are 
disaggregated for the following exporting countries: Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
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 Honduras, and the rest of the world (ROW).  Import values are on a free-on-board (FOB) basis, 
excluding transportation costs, insurance, and custom duties.  Unit values are used as proxies for 
import prices (U.S. dollars per kilogram). 
Summary statistics for import prices, quantities, values, and expenditure shares are 
reported in Table 2.  On average, the price of U.S. banana imports is relatively the same across 
exporting countries.  While ROW prices ($0.354/kg) are somewhat higher compared with the 
other exporting countries, the price difference between the primary suppliers is at most 
$0.035/kg on average.  Bananas from Colombia are the most expensive ($0.319/kg) followed by 
Honduras ($0.294), Costa Rica ($0.292), and Ecuador ($0.288).  The least expensive source is 
Guatemala ($0.284).  On average, Guatemala accounted for the largest share of the U.S. market 
(24.39%) during the period examined, followed by Ecuador (23.96%) and Costa Rica (23.80%).  
Colombia and Honduras accounted for 13.29% and 11.01%, respectively, and ROW accounted 
for 3.55%. 
[Place Table 2 approximately here] 
 
5. Empirical  Results 
The import demand system as specified by equation (4) was estimated using the LSQ procedure 
in TSP (version 5.0) which uses the generalized Gauss-Newton method to estimate the 
parameters in the system (Hall and Cummins, 2005).  Likelihood ratio (LR) tests were used to 
determine the significance of homogeneity and symmetry.  Following Brown and Lee (1992), 
LR tests were also used to determine the adjustment period (lag-length) since a dynamic model 
of lag-length k is nested within a model of lag-length k+1.  Test results are reported in Table 3 
and indicate that both homogeneity and symmetry failed to be rejected at any reasonable 
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 significance level.  Results also indicate that a lag-length of two months is optimal suggesting 
that it takes up to two months for U.S. banana imports to adjust fully to changes in expenditures 
and prices. 
[Place Table 3 approximately here] 
Partial adjustment estimates (lag effects) are reported in Table 4.  The own-lag effects are 
presented along the diagonal; positive values indicate habit persistence and negative values 
suggest inventory adjustment behavior (Sexauer, 1977).  Given that fresh bananas are highly 
perishable, it is not likely that importers maintain banana inventories on a monthly basis.  
Therefore we would expect the own-lag effects to be positive.  Results show that all one-month 
own-lag effects are significant and positive suggesting that the responsiveness of imports to 
changes in prices and expenditures is not instantaneous and that present consumption has a 
positive effect on future consumption (habit effect), ceteris paribus.  Additionally, positive own-
lag effects may also be due to biological and institutional constraints resulting in partial 
adjustments in demand in the short-run (Marsh, 1991).  For instance, contractual obligations 
between domestic retailers and exporting firms may lead to source-specific rigidities in the face 
of changing expenditures and relative prices. 
The two-month own-lag effects are mostly insignificant with the exception of bananas 
from Guatemala and Honduras.  The positive estimate for Guatemala (0.0672) suggests even 
greater responsiveness in the long-run.  While the opposite is true for Honduras (-0.0174), the 
combined own-lag effect over the two periods is still positive. 
[Place Table 4 approximately here] 
The sign and magnitude of the cross-lag effects depend on the relationship between 
imports (substitutes versus complements) and the adjustment behavior of importers (habits 
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 versus inventories).  If bananas from any two countries are substitutes (complements) and 
unrelated to the other countries their cross-lag effect should be negative (positive) given habit 
formation behavior.  Since banana imports from most sources are related to more than one 
competing country (Ecuador and ROW are the exception), we can only discuss the cross-lag 
effects in a ceteris paribus context.  The two-month cross-lag effect of Guatemala on Costa Rica 
(-0.060) provides some insight into the market share reversal discussed in the introduction.  The 
negative estimate suggests that increased imports from Guatemala have a negative effect on 
imports from Costa Rica, ceteris paribus.  However, past imports from Costa Rica have no effect 
on imports from Guatemala. 
Conditional demand estimates are reported in Table 5.  Overall, the dynamic Rotterdam 
model performed reasonably well.  Expenditures, prices and lagged quantities each explained a 
significant percent of the variation in import demand by source.  Given that the model was 
estimated using log-differences, the constant term (γi) measures the trend in imports holding 
prices and expenditures constant where the average annual growth rate in the ith import can be 
approximated as / 100 i w ι γ × .  The constant terms are significant for three countries: Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, and ROW.  The negative estimate for Costa Rica (-0.0083) coupled with the positive 
estimate for Guatemala (0.0061) also explains the observed market share reversal from 2000 to 
2009.  During the period 2000−09, U.S. banana imports from Costa Rica in terms of volume fell 
by 8.2% per year on average, while imports from Guatemala increased by 6.0% per year on 
average.  The constant estimate for Costa Rica indicates that of the 8.2% decrease, 3.5% is due to 
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 trending factors, ceteris paribus.  For Guatemala, of the 6.0% increase 2.5% is due to trending 
factors.
2   
All marginal share estimates or expenditure effects (θi) are positive and significant at the 
0.01 level with the exception of ROW bananas which is significant at the 0.10 level.  These 
estimates indicated how a dollar increase in aggregate banana expenditures (in real terms) is 
allocated across the supplying countries.  Bananas from Costa Rica (0.301) and Guatemala 
(0.283) have the largest marginal share estimates.  The marginal share estimates for Colombia 
(0.093), Ecuador (0.178), Honduras (0.129), and ROW (0.017) are significantly smaller.  
[Place Table 5 approximately here] 
Consistent with theory, the own-price effects (πii) are all negative which ensures that the 
matrix of price effects is negative semidefinite.  However, the estimates for Costa Rica (-0.130), 
Honduras (-0.074), and ROW (-0.028) are the only own-price effects that are statistically 
significant.  The cross-price effects indicate significant competition between Colombia and 
Ecuador (0.030), and Honduras (0.023).  The cross-price effects for Costa Rica are 0.052 
(Ecuador), 0.065 (Guatemala), 0.053 (Honduras), and 0.021 (ROW) indicating that bananas from 
every county except Colombia are substitutes for Costa Rican bananas in the U.S. market.  There 
are also two significant complementary relationships, Colombia and Costa Rica (-0.060), and 
Ecuador and Guatemala (-0.050).  
                                                            
2 The mean import share for Costa Rica and Guatemala is 0.238 and 0.244, respectively.  Given 
the constants -0.0083 and 0.0061, the annual growth for Costa Rica and Guatemala holding 
prices and real aggregate expenditures constant is -0.0083÷0.238×100 = -3.487% and  
0.0061÷0.244×100 = 2.5%, respectively. 
14 
   The positive cross-price effects between Costa Rica and the other exporting countries, 
particularly Guatemala also explains the decline in Costa Rica’s share of the U.S. market.  While 
there has been little difference in banana prices across the supplying countries on average, 
throughout most of the data period Costa Rica’s price relative to Guatemala has been 
consistently greater than one and has trended upward from about 1.0 in 2006 to greater than 1.4 
in 2009, a few outliers aside (Figure 1).  It is during this period when Costa Rica experienced the 
greatest decline in market share: from 24.7% in 2006 to 14.5% in 2009.  During this same 
period, Guatemala’s share increased from 21.6% to 29.6%.  
[Place Figure 1 approximately here] 
The short- and long-run expenditure elasticity, and Hicksian and Marshallian own-price 
elasticities are reported in Table 6.  The expenditure elasticities indicate that imports from Costa 
Rica (1.266), Guatemala (1.151), and Honduras (1.142) are highly responsive to expenditures in 
the short-run where as imports from Colombia (0.714), Ecuador (0.743), and ROW (0.495) are 
expenditure-inelastic in the short-run.  With the exception of bananas from Ecuador, U.S. banana 
imports are expenditure-elastic in the long-run.  Recall that the two-month own-lag effect was 
positive and significant for Guatemala.  Consequently, the long-run expenditure elasticity for 
Guatemala (2.238) is particularly large when compare to the other exporting countries.  The 
long-run expenditure elasticities for the remaining countries (in order of value) are 1.865 (Costa 
Rica), 1.522 (Colombia), 1.375 Honduras, 1.144 (ROW), and 0.927 (Ecuador). 
The uncompensated own-price elasticities show that U.S. banana demand by country is 
mostly inelastic in the short- and long-run.  The exceptions are Costa Rica and ROW where the 
long-run responsiveness of imports to a percentage change in price is -1.252% and -1.917%, 
respectively.  U.S. imports from Ecuador is highly inelastic in both the short- and long-run 
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 (-0.308 and -0.401, respectively), and while imports from Guatemala are also highly inelastic in 
the short-run (-0.366), they are more responsive in long-run (-0.712).  Lastly, imports from 
Honduras are relative more elastic when compared to Ecuador and Guatemala in both the short-
run (-0.783) and long-run (-0.942). 
[Place Table 6 approximately here] 
The short- and long-run Hicksian cross-price elasticities are reported in Table 7.
3  These 
estimates further show the competitive relationship between Costa Rica and the following: 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras and ROW.  In the long-run, the responsiveness of imports from 
Costa Rica to a percentage increase in price is 0.323, 0.405, 0.327 and 0.129 for Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and ROW, respectively.  The long-run effect of Costa Rica’s price on 
Guatemala, Honduras and ROW is relatively larger particularly for the ROW where the 
responsiveness is 1.381. 
 [Place Table 7 approximately here] 
 
6.  Summary and Conclusion 
U.S. banana demand differentiated by country of origin was estimated using the generalized 
dynamic Rotterdam model.  Results indicate that dynamic factors play a significant role in 
determining the allocation of U.S. banana expenditures across exporting sources.  Of particular 
interest was Guatemala’s increased share and Costa Rica’s decreased share of the U.S. banana 
market.  A number of factors explained why Guatemala replaced Costa Rica as the leading U.S. 
supplier in 2007.  (1) Guatemala is the least expensive exporting source on average.  (2) Habit 
persistence, adjustment costs, and other dynamic factors favor Guatemala’s exports.  (3) Given 
                                                            
3 Marshallian cross-price elasticities were mostly insignificant and are not reported.   
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 increases in the relative price of Costa Rica’s bananas, the price competition between Costa Rica 
and Guatemala is highly significant.  (4) Bananas from Costa Rica are highly responsive to own-
price while imports from Guatemala are more price-inelastic.  (5) Heavy rains and fluctuating 
temperatures in Costa Rica have decreased banana production and exports. 
Costa Rica’s decline as a U.S. supplier reflects the fact that the United States has become 
relatively less important as a destination market for Costa Rican bananas.  For instance, in 2001 
total banana exports for Costa Rica were $509 million and the United States was the most 
important market accounting for 58%.  Overtime, the EU has become increasingly important to 
Cost Rica. In 2009, Costa Rica’s banana exports increased to $712 million but the United States 
accounted for a smaller percent of total exports (46%) while the EU accounted for 51% (UN 
Comtrade, 2010). 
National policies of the banana-producing countries likely affect the relative 
competitiveness of the banana exporting countries in terms of price, quality of product, and 
variability of supply.  For instance, both Costa Rica and Ecuador administer minimum reference 
prices for their banana exports; these reference prices are intended to assure a minimum return 
when their product is marketed abroad.  In Ecuador, these reference prices were recently 
buttressed by a round of inspections in response to complaints that some exporters were paying 
less than half the official price (El Universo, 2010).     
Although this study focused on U.S. banana demand, supply factors in the exporting 
countries could also explain Costa Rica’s decline.  Given the risk associated with importing, the 
United States does not rely on a single source for total banana supply and it is likely that volatile 
production in one country could significantly impact U.S. demand.  Consequently, as one 
country becomes a less reliable source, importers reallocate resources to other exporting 
17 
 countries.  Banana production in Costa Rica has been quite erratic since 2001 increasing by as 
much as 21% in 2006 and decreasing by as much as 20% in 2008 (FAOSTAT,  2010).  In 
contrast, banana production in Guatemala has been steadily increasing since 2003.  Production in 
2009 was particularly in Costa Rica where heavy rains and fluctuating temperatures negatively 
impacted supply. As a result, exports were down by 40% which may explain why Costa Rica’s 
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Market Share (%) 
Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador  Guatemala Honduras  ROW 
2000 1,026.39  17.18  31.39  23.05  17.57  7.37  3.43 
2001 1,069.35  4.19  13.37  28.75  22.98  21.13  10.26  3.51 
2002 1,064.30  -0.47  14.03  23.09  25.50  23.19  11.25  2.95 
2003 1,038.15  -2.46  12.34  25.86  24.62  23.67  10.74  2.78 
2004 1,008.00  -2.90  12.18  23.42  22.92  25.77  12.74  2.96 
2005 1,036.84  2.86  14.08  22.21  23.01  26.00  11.53  3.17 
2006 1,101.18  6.21  13.01  24.71  26.25  21.60  10.57  3.85 
2007 1,126.74  2.32  10.44  25.35  22.96  26.35  12.14  2.77 
2008 1,254.89 11.37  12.97  20.25  21.49  28.56  12.20  4.54 
2009 1,454.68 15.92  13.37  14.46  26.44  29.60  11.09  5.05 














Country  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Colombia 0.319  0.069 39,529,100  6,662,105 12,493,200 2,747,052  13.29  2.15
Costa Rica  0.292  0.062  77,960,300  20,639,700  22,008,400  4,305,919  23.80  5.17
Ecuador 0.288  0.064 78,952,600  13,939,000 22,562,600 5,418,918  23.96  4.10
Guatemala 0.284  0.060 81,595,600  17,723,600 23,221,700 7,098,690  24.39  4.67
Honduras 0.294  0.067 35,871,100  8,235,002 10,382,600 2,743,382  11.01  2.22
ROW  0.354 0.068  9,537,564  2,927,141  3,431,336  1,472,596 3.55 1.02







Table 3. Likelihood Ratio Tests Results   






Unrestricted Model  1,451.430       
Homogeneity 1,448.077  6.706  5  0.243 
Homogeneity and Symmetry  1,446.713  2.729  10  0.987 
Dynamic Models         
Three-month lags  1,466.229       
Two-month lags  1,446.713  39.033  30  0.125 
One-month lags  1,411.996  69.433  30  0.000 
No lags with constant  1,310.740  202.511  30  0.000 
No constants  1294.772  31.9373  5  0.000 
All models have homogeneity and symmetry imposed. 
a The number of restrictions is in parenthesis. 
 
  Table 4. Partial Adjustment Estimates for U.S. Banana Imports   
 One-month  lag  γij1  Two-month  lag  γij2 
Country Colombia  Costa  Rica  Ecuador  Guatemala Honduras ROW   Colombia  Costa Rica  Ecuador  Guatemala Honduras  ROW 
Colombia 0.0585
a -0.0027  -0.0182
c -0.0501
a -0.0127 0.0127
b   0.0106  -0.0249
a 0.0025 0.0184 0.0116
c -0.0116
c
  (0.011) (0.007) (0.010)  (0.012) (0.008) (0.006)   (0.011)  (0.007)  (0.010) (0.013)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
Costa Rica  -0.1092
a 0.0532
a -0.0208 0.0101  -0.0016 -0.0169   0.0308  0.0231  0.0335 -0.0600
b 0.0040  0.0467
a 
  (0.026) (0.016) (0.023)  (0.028) (0.018) (0.014)   (0.024)  (0.015)  (0.022) (0.030)  (0.016)  (0.014) 
Ecuador -0.0011  -0.0303
b 0.0499
b  -0.0312 -0.0067 0.0021   0.0113  0.0109  0.0056 -0.0350 -0.0185  -0.0230
c
  (0.024) (0.015) (0.021)  (0.026) (0.017) (0.013)   (0.023)  (0.014)  (0.020) (0.028)  (0.015)  (0.013) 
Guatemala 0.0466
a -0.0121 0.0077 0.0522
a -0.0110 0.0012    -0.0391
b -0.0042 -0.0152  0.0672
a 0.0108  -0.0159
c
  (0.017) (0.011) (0.015)  (0.019) (0.012) (0.010)   (0.016)  (0.010)  (0.014) (0.020)  (0.011)  (0.009) 




b   -0.0200
c -0.0023 -0.0190
c 0.0136  -0.0174
b -0.0003
  (0.012) (0.007) (0.010)  (0.013) (0.008) (0.007)   (0.011)  (0.007)  (0.010) (0.014)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
ROW 0.0082  0.0018  0.0011  -0.0090  -0.0045  0.0155
a   0.0063  -0.0027  -0.0074  -0.0042  0.0095
b 0.0041 
  (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)  (0.007) (0.005) (0.004)   (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.005) (0.008)  (0.004)  (0.004) 




 Table 5. Conditional Demand Estimates for U.S. Banana Imports 




Slutsky Price Effects πij 
Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador  Guatemala Honduras  ROW 
Colombia -0.0024  0.0929




  (0.002)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.015) (0.017) (0.012)  (0.008) 








  (0.004)  (0.036)    (0.048)  (0.030) (0.031) (0.019)  (0.012) 
Ecuador 0.0034 0.1776
a -0.0311  -0.0502
b -0.0043 0.0041 
  (0.004)  (0.033)      (0.033) (0.022) (0.015)  (0.009) 
Guatemala 0.0061
b 0.2832
a -0.0204  0.0020  -0.0016 
  (0.003) (0.025)        (0.036)  (0.020)  (0.012) 
Honduras -0.0013  0.1286
a -0.0737
a 0.0003 





  (0.001)  (0.010)          (0.008) 
   Equation  R
2  0.66  0.66  0.39 0.71 0.69  0.47 
Note: homogeneity and symmetry are imposed. Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. 
 a, b and c denote the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance level, respectively.  




 Table 6. Short- and Long-run Demand Elasticities 
Short-run Long-run 
Expenditure 
Colombia  0.714 (0.127)
a 1.522(0.391)
a 
Costa Rica  1.266 (0.153)
a 1.865(0.284)
a 
Ecuador  0.743 (0.138)
a 0.967(0.222)
a 
Guatemala  1.151 (0.100)
a 2.238(0.395)
a 
Honduras  1.142 (0.150)
a 1.375(0.219)
a 
ROW  0.495 (0.283)
c 1.144(0.703) 
Hicksian own-price 
Colombia  -0.013 (0.122)  -0.028(0.262) 
Costa Rica  -0.549 (0.201)
a -0.809(0.280)
a 
Ecuador  -0.130 (0.139)  -0.170(0.182) 
Guatemala  -0.083 (0.145)  -0.161(0.290) 
Honduras  -0.654 (0.159)
a -0.787(0.192)
a 




Colombia  -0.106 (0.129)  -0.226(0.283) 
Costa Rica  -0.850 (0.193)
a -1.252(0.267)
a 
Ecuador  -0.308 (0.146)
b -0.401(0.198)
b 
Guatemala  -0.366 (0.149)
b -0.712(0.337)
b 
Honduras  -0.783 (0.157)
a -0.942(0.192)
a 
ROW  -0.830 (0.238)
a -1.917(0.720)
a 
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. 
a, b and c denote the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance 




 Table 7. Hicksian Cross-Price Elasticities   
Quantity/Price 
 
Colombia Costa  Rica  Ecuador Guatemala  Honduras  ROW 
Short-run 
Colombia  -0.464 0.227 0.038 0.177 0.036 















b (0.062) (0.039) 
Guatemala  0.020 0.265 -0.204  0.008 -0.007 
  (0.070) (0.124)
b (0.087)
b  (0.080)  (0.048) 
Honduras 0.204 0.468 -0.039 0.018  0.003 
  (0.110)
c (0.171)
a  (0.132)  (0.175)  (0.076) 
ROW  0.135 0.597 0.118 -0.046 0.008 
(0.228) (0.336)
c (0.268) (0.343) (0.246)   
  Long-run 
Colombia  -0.990 0.483 0.081 0.377 0.077 















b (0.081) (0.051) 
Guatemala  0.039 0.516 -0.397  0.016 -0.013 
  (0.136) (0.264)
b (0.171)
b  (0.156)  (0.094) 
Honduras 0.246 0.563 -0.046 0.022  0.003 
  (0.131)
c (0.207)
a  (0.159)  (0.211)  (0.091) 
ROW  0.313 1.381 0.272 -0.107 0.019 
(0.526) (0.748)
c (0.635) (0.787) (0.567)   
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. a, b and c denote the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 
significance level, respectively. ROW is the rest of the world. 


































































Figure 1. Relative Price of Banana Imports from Costa Rica  
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